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Case No. CV-1O-6403 
Docket No. 38716-2011 
--------------------------) 
Jordan S. Ipsen 
************** 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
************** 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Bonneville 
HONORABLE Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Kevin J. Scanlan 
Gordan Law Firm, Inc. 
477 Shoup Ave., Suite 203 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Respondent 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0006403 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Christina Brooksby vs. Geico General Insurance Co 
User: MCGARY 










































New Case Filed-Other Claims 
Judge 
Gregory S. Anderson 
Gregory S. Anderson 
Plaintiff: Brooksby, Christina Notice Of Gregory S. Anderson 
Appearance Jordan S. Ipsen 
Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Gregory S. Anderson 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Ipsen, Jordan S. (attorney for 
Brooksby, Christina) Receipt number: 0049291 
Dated: 10/20/2010 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: 
Brooksby, Christina (plaintiff) 
Complaint Filed Gregory S. Anderson 
Judge Change (batch process) 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dismiss Pursuant to I.RC.P. 12(b)(6) (fax) 
Notice Of Hearing 2-3-11 @ 8:30 a.m. (fax) Dane H Watkins Jr 
Defendant: Geico General Insurance Co Notice Dane H Watkins Jr 
Of Appearance Kevin J. Scanlan 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to !.RCP 12(b)(6) Dane H Watkins Jr 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Dane H Watkins Jr 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Scanlan, 
Kevin J. (attorney for Geico General Insurance 
Co) Receipt number: 0058532 Dated: 
12/21/2010 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Geico 
General Insurance Co (defendant) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/10/2011 09:00 Dane H Watkins Jr 
AM) Motion to Dismiss 
Amended Notice Of Hearing (Telephonic) Dane H Watkins Jr 
2-10-11 @9:-00a.m. (fax) 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dismiss 
Defendant's Reply To Plaintiffs Response To 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To 
IRCP 12(b)(6) 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Minute Entry Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 2/10/2011 
Time: 9:00 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Lettie Messick 
Tape Number: 
Party: Christina Brooksby, Attorney: Jordan Ipsen 




Time: 11 :58 AM 
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icial District Court - Bonneville Cou 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2010-0006403 Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Christina Brooksby vs. Geico General Insurance Co 
User: MCGARY 



































Hearing result for Motion held on 02/10/2011 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Karen Konvalinka 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 pages 
Motion to Dismiss 
Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Dismiss 
Judgment Re: Motion to Dismiss 
Notice of Change of Address 
Defendant's Motion For Award of Costs 
Defendant's Verified Memorandum Of Costs 
Judge 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Defendant's Dane H Watkins Jr 
Verified Memorandum Of Costs 
Appeal Filed In Supreme Court Dane H Watkins Jr 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Dane H Watkins Jr 
Supreme Court Paid by: Gordon Law Firm 
Receipt number: 0019546 Dated: 4/27/2011 
Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: Brooksby, 
Christina (plaintiff) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 19383 Dated Dane H Watkins Jr 
4/26/2011 for 100.00) 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal mailed to S.C. 
Clerk's Certificate Filed (SC) 
Notice of Appeal Filed - Clerk's Record Due 
7/5/11 (SC) 
Clerk's Record Due Date Reset 8/10/11 
z 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Jordan S. Ipsen (ISB #7822) 
GORDON LAW FIRM, INC. 
477 Shoup Ave, Suite 101 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 552-0467 
Facsimile: (866) 886-3419 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV- /()l~1rJ3-
COMPLAINT 
Fee Category: Al 
Filing Fee: $88.00 
Plaintiff, by and through her undersigned counsel of record, hereby alleges and 
complains as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff, Christina Brooksby ("Plaintiff'), is a resident of California. 
2. Defendant, Government Employees Insurance Company ("Geico"), is a 
foreign corporation licensed and authorized to do business in the state of Idaho at all 
relevant times. 
COMPLAINT - 1 
3 
3. The events giving rise to this action occurred in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
4. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims and parties to this action by 
virtue ofldaho Code § 1-705 and § 5-514. 
5. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment 
Act, Idaho Code § 10-1201 et seq. 
6. An actual case and controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendant 
with respect to whether the bodily injuries sustained by Christina Brooksby in a motor 
vehicle accident, \Yhich occurred in Bonneville County, are subject to coverage and/or 
coverage exclusions contained in Craig Brooksby's automobile insurance policy 
purchased from Defendant. 
7. The actual case and controversy existing between Plaintiff and Defendant 
requires the Court to make a declaration as to the rights and obligations of the parties 
hereto, between one another. 
8. Craig Brooksby and Christina Brooksby were involved in a motor vehicle 
collision that occurred on or about December 8, 2007. 
9. Christina Brooksby was travelling as a passenger in Craig'S vehicle on or 
about December 8,2007. 
10. Craig rolled the vehicle two times causing the roof of the vehicle to rip off 
ejecting Plaintiff from the vehicle. 
11. Christina Brooksby was taken to the hospital via ambulance and treated 
for injuries she sustained in the motor vehicle collision. 
COMPLAINT - 2 
4 
12. At the time of the subject collision, Craig Brooksby had an automobile 
insurance policy with Defendant, which provided liability coverage, among other 
coverages. 
13. Plaintiff has made an insurance claim agasint Craig Brooksby's policy for 
the bodily injuries and other damages she sustained in the subject motor vehicle collision. 
14. Defendant has denied Plaintiff's claim based upon a so-called "household 
exclusion. " 
15. The Idaho legislature mandates insurance coverage for damge, injury, or 
death suffered "by any person." 
16. The Idaho Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "the household 
exclusion clause is flatly and unmistakably in violation ofldaho's compulsory insurance 
law" and that "the clause is unenforceable, and void as agasint public policy." 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants declaring: 
1. That Craig Brooksby was insured by Defendant at the time of the subject 
collision. 
2. That Craig Brooksby had in effect liability coverage at the time of the 
subject collision. 
3. That there are no applicable exclusions under the Policy which would 
allow Defendant to deny coverage for damages Plaintiff sustained as a 
result of the subject motor vehicle collision. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
COMPLAINT - 3 
5 
DATED October 20,2010. 
+-
Jordan S. Ipsen 
COMPLAINT - 4 
6 
Kevin J. Scanlan 
ISB #5521, kjs@.hallfarley.com 
Bryan A. Nickels 
ISB #6432, ban@hallfarJey.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:I4\4-378.l\PLEADfNGS\Dismiss-12(b)(6) Memo.doc 
Attorneys for Defendant GEICO General Insurance Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH mnICIAL DISTRICT OF ~ 
I 




CHRlSTINABROOKSBY, Case No. CV-10-6403 : 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.RfCP. 




COMES NOW the defendant, GEIeO General Insurance Company, (h6reinafter 
I 
"GEl CO"), by and through its counsel of record, and hereby submits this memorkdum in 
support of its motion to dismiss, seeking this Court's order dismissing the claims ag~st it by 
plaintiff Christina Brooksby ('<Plaintiff' or "Ms. Brooksby"), as contained in Plaintiffs 
I 
Complaint ("Complaint") with prejudice, on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to stfte claims 
upon which relief can be granted against defendant GEreO. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 




12/15/1U 17; J2 i"AA 2U1I J~o 11::>110 "t!.:JVV~1 V.1..L 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I 
I 
Plaintiff s Complaint is devoid of any allegation that she is an insured under be policy 
I 
upon which she seeks to sue. Rather, the Complaint attempts to establish the insured status of 
• I , 
! 
Craig Brooksby, and, in conjunction therewith, coverage under his policy for automobile liability 
coverage ("the Policy") for Plaintiff's claimed damages. As Plaintiff fails to assert an~ere in 
the Complaint that she is an insured under the Policy, and because she otherwise abmpts to 
I 
! 




constitutes a third-party direct action against GEICO, which Idaho courts have repeatedly stated 
I 
are barred. Thus, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be Janted and 
I 
f 
should be dismissed. Further, GErCO is entitled to its attorney fees. 
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS I 
I 
I 
Plaintiff alleges that in December 2007, she was injured and taken by ambulance to a 
I 
I 
hospital after Craig Brooksby rolled the vehicle in which she was a passenger and she was 
I 
ejected. Complaint at ~~ 8-11. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant GEICO insured Craig'Brooksby 
I 
under the Policy at the time ofthe accident and that, thus, OEICO may not deny her coverage for 
I 
I 
the damages she sustained in the accident. Id at 3. Plaintiff does not allege anYW4ere in the 
Complaint that she is an insured of GEICO under the Policy. 








Idaho Rille of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) provides that a motion to dismiss may re brought 
upon a plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under I.R.C.P. 
I 
12(b)(6), an action should be dismissed when, after reading the complaint in the ~ight most 
I 
I 
favorable to the plaintiff, it appears the plaintiff has alleged no facts in support of rer claims 
I 
I 
which would entitle her to relief. See, Rincover v. Dep '( of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 128 Idahb 653,917 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO I.R.CP.12(b)(6) - 2 
8 




P.2d 1293 (1996). In order to withstand a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party ~ust allege 
1 
I 
all essential elements of the claims presented. Johnson v. Boundary School Dist. No. 101, 138 
I 
Idaho 331, 334, 63 P Jd 457, 460 (2003). ' 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff Fails to Allege She is an Insured Under the Policy at Issue., 
I 




policy. "'It is well established that absent a contractual or statutory provision authbrizing the 
1 
I 
action, an insurance carrier cannot be sued directly and cannot be joined as a party gefendant." 
I 
Graham v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Coo, 138 Idaho 611, 613, 67 P.3d 90,'92 (2003) 
I 
! 
(quoting Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West. Inc., 101 Idaho 783,791, 621 P.2d 399, 407 
I 
i 
(1980». The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that a third-party cannot fnaintain a 
I 
direct action against an insurer on the theory that the plaintiff was a third-party benefifiary under 




The Idaho Supreme Court has also prevented a third-party from joining to thb litigation 
. ! 
I 
the insurer of a tortfeasor for the insurer's alleged intentional delay of payment Of a claim. 
I 
I 
Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 118 Idaho 373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990). In that c~e, the trial 
I 
court dismissed the insurance company from the suit. Id. On appeal, the trial court'~ dismissal 
I 
i 
I was affinned. Id. 
I 
The plaintiff in Hettwer was injured in an automobile accident by defendant. lId. at 373, 
797 P.2d at 81. The plaintiff attempted to join the defendant's insurance company as a 
defendant, alleging that (1) the insurance company insured the defendant under an ~utomobile 
I 
I 
liability policy at the time of the accident, (2) the plaintiff had presented claims to th~ insurance 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO 1.R.CP. 12(b)(6) - 3 
9 
n:I.LL r :l.nL.t:..t ~VVVf V.L..&. 




tortiously denied or delayed payment on these claims. Jd. The Idaho Supreme Court :held there 
I 
i 
was no basis for a third-party claim against the insurance company. Id. at 374, 797 P.2d at 82. 
I 
Not only did the Idaho Supreme Court affirm the dismissal of the action against the! insurance 
company, but the Court stated, that it found the appeal to be "unreasonable an~ without 
foundation." Id. 
Thus, the law in Idaho as to whether a third-party may bring a cause of action !against an 
I 
I 
insurer has been well settled - in summary, direct actions are not permitted. See, e.g.,; Pocatello 
I 
Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho at 791 ("It is well established that absent a 
I 
contractual or statutory provision authorizing the action, an insurance carrier cannot be sued 
I 
I 
directly and cannot be joined as a party defendant."); Downing v. Travelers Ins. Co., i107 Idaho 
i 
at 514-15 ("Appellant should not be allowed to sue the insurance company directly' any more 
I 
than a tort victim injured in an automobile accident should be able to directly sue th~ insurance 
i 
carrier of the tortfeasor without having fIrst proved a claim against the tortfeasor individually. "); 
I , 
I 
see also Hartman v. United Herifage Property and Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 199, 108 P.3d 340, 
I 
346 (2005)("The basis of the no-direct-action rule is that the person allegedly injured by the 
i 
insured is not a party to the insurance contract and has no rights under it. <Insurance ~olicies are 
I 
I 
a matter of contract between the insurer and the insured."')(quoting Trinity Universal!ns. Co, v, 
I 
Kirsling, 139 Idaho 89, 92, 73 P.3d 102, 105 (2003); Sfonewall Surplus Lines Irirurance v. 
i 
Farmers Insurance, 132 Idaho 318,971 P.2d 1142 (1998)("A third party may not directly sue an 
I 




MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 





In this case, Plaintiff does not allege that she is directly insured by GEICO tinder the 
I 
Policy. Indeed, Plaintiff s Complaint is expressly fTamed in the context of her makihg claim 
against the policy of a non-party, Craig Brooksby: 
! 
I 
6. An actual case and controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendant wi.fu 
respect to whether the bodily injuries sustained by Christina Brooksby in a mot~r 
vehicle accident, which occurred in Bonneville County, are subject to coverage 
and/or coverage exclusions contained in Craig Brooksby's automobile 





12. At the time of the subject collision, Craig Brooksby had an automobile 
insurance poJicy with Defendant, which provided liability coverage, amon.g 
other coverages. ! 
I 
13. Plaintiff has made an insurance claim agasint [sic] Craig Brooksby's polib-
for the bodily injuries and other damages she sustained in the subject mo~r 
vehicle collision. i 
I 
(emphases added). Clearly, Plaintiff's allegations are entirely framed as third-pariy claims 
I 
against GErCO, with whom she does not contend she has any policy or contrac~ and are 
improperly asserted under a policy insuring someone else (Craig Brooksby). Further, ~rOOkSby 
, 
has failed to allege any statutory or contractual provi sian that would authorize her sillt against 
I 
I 
GEICQ, Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint is defective on its face as violative Of Idaho's 
I 
I 
prohibition of direct actions, and should be dismissed. l ! 
B. Plaintiff Otherwise Improperly Seeks to Determine the Rights as JIght Exist 
Between GEICO and Its Insured, Craig Brooksby. I 
I 
Even if Plaintiff were to have asserted that she were an insured, or otherwise ~ttempt to , 
do so in responding to this motion, Plaintiff's Complaint still remains defective, becake it does 
I 
I 
1 In making this argument, defendant assumes that Plaintiff is advancing the position that Idaho la,l. applies, as 
reflected by Plaintiffs Idaho law argument in her Complaint, at"r15-16. Thus, defendant makes its argument as to 
the direct action rule strictly through the lens of Plaintiff's Complaint, which advocates application ofldaho law. Tn 
making this motion, defendant does not waive any arguments it may have as to the applicable law that may 
illtimately apply to any action for damages arising out of the underlying accident, and does not necessarily agree that 
Idaho law will govern resolution of such a dispute. i 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 





not seek declaratory relief as to her own claimed rights under the Policy, but, rathet, seeks to 
! 
I 
determine the rights of Craig Brooksby (a non-party) under the tenns of the Policy. !Plaintiff's 
I 
prayer for relief illustrates this point: 
I 
i 





1. That Craig Brooksby was insured by Defendant at the time of the subject 
collision. I 
2. That Craig Brooksby had in effect liahility coverage at the time of ~e 
subject collision. i 
3. That there are DO applicable exclusions under- the Policy which would aUbw 
Defendant to deny coverage for damages Plaintiff sustained as a result of the 
subject motor vehicle collision. ! 






(emphases added). As Plaintiff does not seek a detennination of any rights she may bave under 
- I 
the Policy - instead apparently seeking to have this Court issue a declaratory judgme~t as to the 
I 
I 
rights under the Policy as exist between defendant and a non-partY, Craig Brooksbv - the 
I 
Complaint remains defective on its face in violating Idaho's prohibition on direct actiop.s. 





For the reasons stated above, defendant GEICO's Motion to Dismiss should te granted, 
I 
and those claims against it by Brooksby, as contained in her Complaint, should be; dismissed 
i 
with prejudice. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 









.J..'::I .1.0 ( J.U .1.1; J"! r.'iA "::UO J:>v OVOV 
RESPECTFULL Y S TED this If'day of December, 2010. 
I 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 




B+ A. Nick - the Finn 
Attorneys for Defi dant GEICO 
I 
:MEMORANDUM IN SUPP(l)RT OF DEFETANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS I 
PURSUANT TO I.RCP. 12(lJ)(6) - 7 
,II 13 
~~/l~/iU il:J4 ~.~ ~UO J~D ODOD 
__ ---... ------------'-----nn.-LL-r.-<lA~2--.. __ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J:t:. day of December, 2010, I caused to b~ served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following; ! 
Jordan S. Ipsen 
GORDON LAW FIRM, INC. 
477 Shoup Avenue, Ste. 101 




8 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid o Hand Delivered o Overnight Mail 
~ Telecopy I o Email sky@brentgordonlaw.com 
I 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO LRCP. 12(b)(6)"- 8 
14 
Richard E. Hall 
ISB #1253, reh@hallfarley.com 
Kevin J. Scanlan 
ISB #5521, kjs@,hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W\4\4-378.1\PLEADINGS\Dismiss--12(b)(6) Motion.doc 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -10-6403 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 
TO I.R.CP. 12(b)(6) 
COMES NOW Defendant Government Employees Insurance Company, (hereinafter 
"GEICO"), by and through its counsel Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby 
submits this motion to dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), seeking 
this Court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims against GEICO as contained in Plaintiff's 
Complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.CP. 12(b)(6) - 1 
15 
This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss lodged 
herewith and the record in this matter. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 4 day of December, 2010. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4 day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Jordan S. Ipsen 
GORDON LAW FIRM, INC. 
477 Shoup Avenue, Ste. 101 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 866/886-3419 
g} U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy 
D Email sky@brentgordonlaw.com 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.CP. 12(b)(6) - 2 
1 
Jordan S. Ipsen (ISB #7822) 
GORDON LAW FIRM, INC. 
477 Shoup Ave, Suite 101 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 552-0467 
Facsimile: (866) 886-3419 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-10-6403 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, by and through her undersigned counsel, hereby submits the following 
memorandum of law in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Craig Brooksby was travelling on Interstate 15 near Idaho Falls, Idaho just after midnight 
on December 8, 2007. Brooksby was travelling with his wife, Brenda, and his daughter, 
Christina. The Brooksbys were travelling from Manteca, California to Idaho Falls, Idaho to 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
17 
attend the marriage of Craig and Brenda's daughter, Lori Brooksby, on December 8, 2007. Near 
milepost 118, Craig lost control of his vehicle while driving approximately 55 miles per hour. 
The vehicle made a 180 degree tum on the roadway, slid off the right shoulder, and rolled. The 
roof was ripped completely off as the vehicle rolled and Christina flew out of the top of the 
vehicle. Christina landed on the shoulder of the frontage road, approximately 49 feet away from 
the van. 
Christina was transported to Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center immediately 
following the collision, where she was diagnosed with having a contusion to the back of her head 
causing nausea and vomiting and three fractured vertebrae in the thoracic spine. Christina made 
a claim against Craig's automobile insurance policy with GmCO General Insurance Company 
("GEICO") for the damages sustained in the collision. GEICO has denied the claim based on a 
so-called "household exclusion" clause. Christina filed suit against Craig in Bonneville County 
Case No. CV-09-7120. Since Christina does not wish to pursue a recovery against her father if 
there is no applicable insurance coverage, the Honorable Joel E. Tingey ordered a stay in the 
proceedings pending the results of this declaratory action. Christina has brought this declaratory 
action against GEICO for purpose of determining whether there is insurance coverage for the 
damages she sustained in the automobile collision on December 8, 2007. 
GEICO has brought a motion to dismiss Christina's declaratory action pursuant to Rule 
12(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The sole legal argument in support of the motion is 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
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that the declaratory action constitutes an impermissible third-party direct action against GEICO. 
(Mem. in Supp. ofDef.'s Mot to Dismiss Pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) at 2.) 
STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, without affidavits or 
deposition testimony introduced into the record either in support or in opposition, is addressed 
solely to the sufficiency of the complaint. See Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960,962, 
895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995). All inferences from the facts pleaded in the complaint must be drawn 
in favor of the party opposing the motion; and the issue presented is "whether the plaintiff is 
entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id. A motion to dismiss should be granted if a 
party can show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 
(2006). 
On a motion to dismiss, the Court looks only at the pleadings, and all inferences are 
viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City o/Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 
1157, 1159 (2002). The burden at all times is upon the moving party to prove the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 
362 (1969). 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Defendant's sole argument in support of its motion to dismiss is that Plaintiffs "lawsuit 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
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constitutes a third-party direct action against GEICO." (Mem. in Supp. Of Def.'s Mot to Dismiss 
Pursuant to I.R. c.P. 12(b)( 6) at 2.) Defendant has cited to seven cases in support of its 
accusation that Christina has brought an improper third-party claim against GEICO. (ld. at 2-4.) 
However, not one of these cases is on point. Not one of these seven cases holds that an injured 
party cannot bring a declaration action against the torfeasor's insurance carrier to determine the 
extent of liability insurance coverage. The cases cited by Defendant are the following: 
1. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 611, 67 P.3d 90 (2003) stands for 
the unremarkable proposition that an injured party can not bring a tort action (the so-
called "direct third-party action") seeking damages against the tortfeasor's insurance 
carrier for bad faith. Christina Brooksby is not bringing a tort action against GEICO nor 
is she seeking to recover damages from GEICO. 
2. Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel W, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980) holds 
that a lessor's insurance carrier could not maintain an action for indemnification against a 
lessee's insurance carrier for payments the lessee's insurance carrier had paid to an 
employee of lessee who was injured due to the lessor's negligence. 
3. Downing v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 511, 691 P.2d 375 (1984) holds that a widow 
of an injured party could not maintain an action against the injured party's employer's 
insurance carrier as a "third party beneficiary" to the insurance contract. Again, Christina 
Brooksby is not seeking insurance benefits from GEICO under the policy it issued to 
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Craig Brooksby, but rather is seeking a declaration regarding liability insurance coverage. 
4. Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990), like Graham, holds that 
an injured party cannot seek damages from a tortfeasor's insurer for tortiously denying or 
delaying payment of a claim. Christina is not claiming that GEICO tortiously denied her 
claim; rather she is seeking a declaration that there is indeed insurance coverage for the 
subject automobile collision. 
5. Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 108 P.3d 340 (2005) holds 
that the judgment creditors of a tortfeasor could not maintain a direct action against the 
tortfeasor's insurance carrier for breach of contract or for the tort of bad faith. 
6. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho 89, 92 73 P.3d 102, 105 (2003) merely 
states that "insurance policies are a matter of contract between the insurer and the 
insured." 
7. Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 318, 971 P.2d 1142 
(1998) holds that the insurance carrier of a tortfeasor could not seek indemnification from 
a co-tortfeasor's insurance carrier because indemnification should have been sought from 
the co-tortfeasor. 
None of the cases cited by GEICO are applicable to the case at bar. Not one ofthe cases 
stands for the proposition that an injured party cannot maintain a declaratory action against the 
tortfeasor's insurance carrier to determine the extent of the insurer's liability coverage. 
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There is an evident distinction between a claim for damages and a declaratory action 
seeking a determination of liability coverage. In Christian v. Sizemore, 383 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 
1989), the trial court denied an injured party's request to amend the personal injury complaint 
against the tortfeasor to add a claim against the tortfeasor's insurance carrier after the insurance 
carrier asserted that the policy had lapsed at the time of the automobile collision. The trial court 
denied the motion relying on a case that states, "An injured party may not join the defendant's 
insurance carrier in a suit for damages filed against the defendant arising from a motor vehicle 
accident, unless the insurance policy or a statute authorizes such direct action." Id. at 812. The 
appellate court overruled the trial court, explaining that the rule prohibiting a third-party direct 
action is not applicable to a declaratory action. 
In this case, however, the plaintiff is not seeking to recover damages against the 
defendants' insurance carrier. Instead, she seeks a declaration that Kemper [the 
tortfeasor's insurer] is required to provide insurance coverage to the defendants 
in the personal injury suit. This declaration is entirely ancillary to the personal 
injury suit for damages against the defendants. 
Id. Similarly, in Reagor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 415 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. 1980), an injured party 
brought a personal injury suit against an alleged tortfeasor and a separate declaratory action 
against the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. The appellate court framed the insurance carrier's 
argument thusly: "Travelers also argues that this action cannot be maintained because it would 
be contrary to our State's policy of prohibiting direct actions against an insurer before judgment 
has been rendered against its insured." Id. at 515. The court soundly rejected that argument 
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stating: 
The issue of coverage, which is the subject of this action, has been effectively 
severed from any question of the insured's liability and the assessment of 
damages, which will be determined in the pending personal injury action. Under 
these circumstances, plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action cannot be barred on 
the basis that it is a direct action suit against the insurer. 
Id The court went on to hold that "the trial court in this case may grant declaratory relief 
determining whether there is coverage under the policy." Id at 516. 
The prohibition against bringing a direct action for damages against a tortfeasor is not 
implicated by Christina Brooksby's Complaint. Brooksby is not seeking a recovery of damages 
caused by GEICO's insured's negligence. Brooksy has standing to bring this action pursuant to 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, I.C. § 10-1201 et seq. Idaho Code § 10-1202 sets forth 
who may bring a declaratory action thusly: 
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other wrltmgs 
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
"An injured party may bring a declaratory judgment action against the defendant's insurance 
carrier to determine if there is policy coverage before obtaining a judgment against defendant in 
the personal injury action where the defendant's insurer has denied coverage." 22A Am. Jur. 2d 
Declaratory Judgments § 138 (2003). Numerous cases exist in which an injured party has 
brought a declaratory action against the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. See generally, Id. See, e.g., 
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Richmond v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 727 A.2d 968 (1999) (wife who was passenger is 
husband's automobile sought declaratory action against husband's insurer to determine extent of 
liability insurance coverage). Courts have also specifically held that an injured party has a right 
to bring a declaratory action against the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. See, e.g., Beeson v. State 
Auto. & Casualty Underwriters, 508 P.2d 402, affd, 516 P.2d 623 (Colo. 1973); Atkinson v. 
Atkinson, 326 S.E.2d 206 (Ga. 1985); Reagor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 415 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. 1980); 
Baca v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 486 P.2d 625 (N.M. 1971). See also e.g., Draper v. 
Draper, 115 Idaho 973, 772 P.2d 180 (1989) ("Barbara also included in the action a claim 
against State Farm and Van, requesting a declaratory judgment that the household exclusion was 
void and that there was coverage for her injuries under the policy. State Farm filed a 
counterclaim against Barbara and a cross-claim against Van, requesting a declaratory judgment 
that the household exclusion was valid and that State Farm had no liability to Barbara under the 
policy."); 
In Temperance Insurance Exchange v. Carver, 83 Idaho 487, 490, 365 P.2d 824, 826 (1961), 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "Injured third parties are proper, but not necessary, parties 
defendant in an action brought by an insurer for a declaratory judgment determining the validity 
of an insurance policy, and its liability thereunder." In 2008, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 
was amended to add the following language: 
In an action seeking declaratory judgment as to coverage under a policy of 
insurance, any person known to any party to have a claim against the insured 
relating to the incident that is the subject of the declaratory action shall be joined 
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if feasible. 
Christian Brooksby has standing, as an injured party, to bring a declaratory action against 
GEICO to seek determination regarding whether there is liability insurance coverage in a claim 
she is making against GEICO's insured. No plausible reading of Plaintiffs Complaint could 
construe it as direct third-party action. It is indisputable that it is an action seeking a declaration 
regarding the extent of insurance coverage under a policy issued by Defendant. Any attempt to 
characterize it as a direct third-party action is not grounded in fact nor warranted under existing 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's sole argument is that Plaintiff cannot bring a direct action against the 
Defendant since Plaintiff has not claimed that she is an insured under the policy. Plaintiffs 
action is not a direct action. Therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied. 
DATED January 28, 2011 
Jordan S. Ipsen 
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Attorneys for Defendant GEICO General Insurance Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CHRISTINA BROOKSBY, Case No. CV-1O-6403 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.CP. 
12(b)(6) 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the defendant, GEICO General Insurance Company, (hereinafter 
"GEl CO"), by and through its counsel of record, and hereby submits this memorandum in reply 
to Plaintiffs response to Geico's motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
In response to GEICO's motion to dismiss her lawsuit on the basis that it constitutes a 
third-party direct action against GEICO, which Idaho courts have repeatedly stated are barred, 
Plaintiff fails to cite to any viable Idaho authority, misapprehends the application of I.R.C.P. 57, 
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and asks this Court to ignore the reality that through her Complaint she seeks damages under a 
contract to which she is not a party without any liability issues having been litigated. Plaintiff 
has failed to show that her Complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,' and the 
Court should therefore dismiss it. 
A. Plaintiff Cites to No Viable Idaho Case Law to Support Her Position 
In her response, Plaintiff cites to several cases from other states in order to support her 
position. It is axiomatic, however, that in Idaho, judicial "decisions from sister states are not 
controlling," and that this Court is bound to "apply to the case under consideration that line of 
decisions which ... [are] consonant with [Idaho law] ... , regardless of any numerical weight of 
authority." Oneida Counry Fair Bd v. Smylie, 86 Idaho 341, 367, 386 P.2d 374, 391 (1963). In 
other words, even though Plaintiff has cited cases from six other states, the only decisions 
applicable to the motion before this Court are those that are in line with valid Idaho law.1 
Even if the cases cited by Plaintiff were binding on this Court, they would remain inapt. 
For example, Plaintiff cites Reagor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 415 N.E.2d 512, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1980) as supportive of her action. In Reagor, there was an underlying personal injUry action 
between the plaintiffs and the alleged tortfeasor. By contrast, Plaintiff makes no allegation that 
any such action is pending in this matter.2 See CampI. at 1-4. Perhaps more importantly, the 
applicable law cited by the Illinois court included a key concept foreign to Idaho: that an injured 
party "is a real party in interest to the liability insurance contract." Id at 514; compare wifh 
I Again, in making this argument, defendant assumes that Plaintitf is advancing the position that Idaho taw applies, 
as reflected by Plaintiffs Idaho law argument in her Complain!, at ~'lf15-16. Indeed, Plaintiffs opposition does not 
appear to suggest tnat she believes that any other Slate's law applies. Thus, defendant makes its argument as (0 the 
direct action rule strictly through the Jens of Plaintiffs Complaint and opposition, which advocate application of 
Idaho law. Again, in making this motion, defendant does not waive any arguments it may have as to the applicable 
Jaw that may ultimately apply in this action (including, but not limited to, California law), and does not necessarily 
agree that Idaho law will govern resolution of this dispute. 
Z Plaintiff's opposition memorandum does contend that there exists an action against Craig Brooksby, and that such 
action is stayed; however, the Complaint makes no such assertion. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss, at p.2. Moreover, a review of ISTARS reflects that the case cited by plaintiff is closed. 
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Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 199, 108 PJd 340,346 (2005) 
("[T]he person allegedly injured by the insured is not a party to the insurance contract and has 
no rights under it.")(emphasis added). Thus, Reagor offers nothing by way of guidance to 
detennination of the motion at bar. 
Similarly, Plaintiff cites to Richmond v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 727 A.2d 968, 
970 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), in support of her position that she is not barred from brillging the 
, I 
instant suit under Idaho's direct-action law. In that case, however, the plaintiff in Richmond was 
I 
the spouse of the defendant in the underlying litigation, and her declaratory action suit sought 
coverage, in part, under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy (thus, claiming status as 
an insured). Id Plaintiff has made no such assenion here. Moreover, the Richmond court reJied 
upon the Hartford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woodfin Equities Corp. decision, which confirmed that, under 
Maryland law, "[o]nce there is a verdict or judgment in the tort action, a direct action may be 
maintained against the liability insurer." 687 A.2d 652 (Md. 1997), While this may provide a 
basis to approve pre-judgment direct actions in Maryland, Idaho lacks such legal predi~ate, as in 
Idaho, even judgment creditors are barred from pursuing direct actions. Hartman, 141 Idaho at 
198 ("We have never held that an insured's judgment creditor has a direct action against 
the insurer.")( emphasis added). 
In Atkinson v. Atkinson, another foreign case cited by Plaintiff to support her position, 
326 S.E.2d 206 (Ga. 1985) (holding that mother of a child killed in automobile accident was 
I 
entitled to bring declaratory action to determine insurer's duty to defend its insured in underlying 
wrongful death action), the declaratory action actually aro~e as a complicated question relating to 
I 
a settlement with one claimant and a subsequent intervention by a second claimant based upon a 
divorce-related dispute between the two claimants. The actual issue was whether, based upon a 
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return of settlement monies, the insurer had to again defend its insured; the case does not specify 
which party raised the question, nor is the factual posturing of Atkinson even remotely similar to 
this action- Thus, Atkinson and jts procedural complexities are unhelpful in this matter. 
In Baca v. New Mexico State Highway Dept., ~other case to which Plaintiff cites, the 
action was again posited upon existing underlying litigation. 0486 P.2d 625, 626 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1971) ("[a]ctions involving deaths and personal injuries resulting from the collision of motor 
vehicles were brought"). The court in Baca, however; emphasized the unique posture of the 
. , 
case, which involved a suit against the New Mexico State Highway Department: "The 
Department is immune from suit in the absence of liability insurance coverage (§ 5-6-19 and § 5-
j : 
6-20, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol, 2) .... As has been pointed out, no action is maintainable 
against the Department in the absence of liability insurance coverage extended to the particular 
i 
accident. '" In our view, an actual controversy does I exist, as between the plaintiffs and the 
Company with respect to coverage, absent which the suit against the Department is not 
maintainable." Id. at 960 & 963. Thus, the unique imn.i.unitY question posed in Baca, a 40 year-
old decision from another jurisdiction, again is wholly ,distinct from this action, as plaintiff has 





The next case that Plaintiff cites from another st~te iri 'support of her position is Beeson v. 
1 I" 




Beeson, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in the later case E,armers Ins. Exch. v. Disl. Court for 
i' 
Fourth Judicial Disl., 862 P.2d 944, 947 (Colo. 1993),;rointed out that in Beeson, "[t]he losing 
, , " it 
insurance companies appealed the substantive decision ~f ~he court. None of them raised the 
! ' I 
3 In plaintifFs opposition briefmg, plaintiff simply indicates that she "does not wish to pursue a recovery against her 
father if there is no applicable insurance coverage[.)" Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at p.2. 
; : !:. 
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question of whether the [injured party] had standing tol bririg the action. Neither the 'court of 
I L 
" II 
appeals nor this court addressed e issue of standing." 'The Farmers court went on to hold that 
•. I , 
the injured party lacked standing to bring a declaratory iudg~ent action before she had :obtained 
I Ii 
a judgment against other driver. Id. at 948-49 ("The issue bf whether a plaintiff may bring a 
: I: 
declaratory judgment action a 'nst a defendant's i~su~ce company, before obtaining a 
I ;, ' , " ! 
judgment against the defendant, S one of first impressi~m fJr this court. However, other states 
.1 
that have considered the questio 
an action.") 






Plaintiff further cites to case decided by the Idbho Supreme Court, but fails to .point out 
: . I. ! 
'1 
that the Court in that case held as a threshold matter ~at Oregon law applied to the issue of 
I l 
i . f 
whether a household exclusion i an insurance policy was valid. Draper v. Draper, 115 Idaho 
I 1 
II ' 
973, 772 P.2d 180 (1989) (hold" g that the law of Oregon applied and that under Oregon law at 
) . 
time of accident, the household exclusion was valid). IThe!;court did not decide Draper under 
, ':; I 
Idaho law, which is the law P intiff seeks to have govern this case. Furthennore, both the 
, II : 
I . I, 
plaintiff and defendant had an wnership interest in th~ au~omobile involved in the accident at 
I .I: 
I .' :1· ! 
issue in Draper. Id. at 974 (" e primary issue prese:nted:j}s whether the household exclusion 
clause contained in the insur e policy was void, ~~owilig a wife (Barbara) to maintain an 
action against her husband 01 ) up to the limits ot th~!'!poliCY .... Van and Barbara were 
1 i'l 
residents of Nyssa, Oregon. St e Farm insured a 1979 aut&mobile (the insured vehicle) owned 
; : ,1:1 . I 'II 
by Van and Barbara)(emphass added). By contrast; Pl~~tiff does not contend that she had 
any ownership interest in the hicle driven by craig! ~r~J~bY, Thus, Draper does. not offer 
I I,,: 
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Plaintiff also cites Chris ian v. Sizemore, 383 'U.E.2d 810, 812 (W.V. 1989) for the 
'j " . , : . , . 
• • - "_ I • ~ • 
proposition that the present SU1~ can be mamtamed d : ng the pendency of an lnJUTY SUlt; 
. ,I ; 
,; " l' . th b d rl-n~t however, plaintiff disregards thati e basis for the Court :r f mg ffi at case was ase on eXUl.H 
law that: "This Court has reco ized that an injured :~laintiff who has obtained a judgment 
against a defendant vehicle ow i er or operator is entiJe~ to maintain a declaratory judgment 
action against the defendant's inLance carrier to imPoJe'liability under the policy." fa. at 812. 
;11 b I~; h . . d tho ,. d 
For that reason, "there is an a~ral controversy etwe~n1 t c msurance carner an e ffiJure 
plaintiff because of the very tlal possibility that thl plaintiff will look to the insurer for 
payment." Id. at 814. This c~t offers nothing to thJ piesent action, however, as th~ right to 
I :1· ' ~. , 
recover via direct action as a jUel ment-creditor is expre,~siy barred by Idaho law. Hartman, 141 
I 'I . 




Finally, Plaintiff cites to emperance lnsurance:Exchange v, Carver, an Idaho case from 
:j 
1961, to oppose Defendant's ffietion to dismiss. 83 Idhllb 487, 365 P.2d 824. Again, this case 
·1 :1 .: 
does not offer valid support fori Plaintiff's position. PlamtifPs citation to language within that 
case ignores the key compon'r of the stat~ment: "Lj!"ed third parties are proper, but not 
necessary, paTties defendant J an action brought ~ an insurer ror a declaratory judgment 
deternllning the validity of an :Lanee pOlicy, and tS!liability thereunder." 83 Idaho at 491 
(emphasis added). In this m.l er, plamtiff is, by df!i/ition, not a party defendant, nor did 
GEICO initiate this lawsuit, n) does this lawsuit eve~ ~~litate any coverage dispute between 
GEICO and its insured Mr. Bn! ksby. In any event, IrO'S bar on direct third-party action law 
has been more than amply deJ oped since Temperan~e.!See,· e,g., Pocatello Indus, Park Co_ v_ 
:1 1 . 
Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,791, 621 P.2d 399
1
, :07 (1980) (holding that "(ijt is well 
I ' 
I ( , 
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established that absent a contractual or statutory provisio~ authorizing the action, an insurance 
carrier cannot be sued directly an1 cannot be joined as a p~y defendant); Downing v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 511, 515, 6r I P.2d 375, 379 (1984)! (holding that wife of deceased train 
engineer could not maintain direct action against insurer!: on theory that she was a third-party 
beneficiary under sn:up policy). rus' plaintiffs citation r Temperance is unaVailing. . , 
In short, Plamtlff cites to no v1able Idaho authonty In her OpposItton to Defendant s 
motion to dismiss that supports ht position. : 
B. Plaintiff MisapP1ebendS the Application if I.R.C.P. 57 
Plaintiff cites I.R.C.P. 57 in opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. That rule 
provides in relevant part that: 
" 
~ , . 
In an action seeking declaratory judgment ~s to coverage under a policy of 
insurance, any person kdown to any party to bare a· claim against the insured 
relating to the incident thltt is the subject of the declaratory action shall be joined 
if feasible. Ii' . 
This rule contemplates the jOinder of a third-party claimFt 1? a declaratory action between an 
. d' d Th . I hi th' i I. b h' dth msurer an Insure. at IS not t s case, as ere 1S no actIon etween t e msurer an e 
insured. Here, Plaintiff seeks tJ bring a direct claim against defendant insurer, a procedure not 
contemplated by Rule 57. 
Accordingly, Idaho Rul of Civil Procedure 57 does not provide support for Plaintiffs 
opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. :. 
C. Plaintiff Seeks tJ Recover Damages Wit~ou t :Litigating Liability 
The Idaho Supreme C01rt has already opined oJ tk question of whether a t~d-party 




issues of coverage between themselves. ~ . 
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The Court stated that: I 
I . , 
. We ~ave never help that an i~sured's judg~en1 ~redito: has. a. direct action 
agamst the msurer. In support of therr argument that we; have ImpitcItly approved 
such actions, the Hartm~s cite language fr~m Do~ing v. Travelers Insurance 
Co., 107 Idaho 511, 514r15, 691 P.2d 3751378-~9:(1:984), wherein we stated, 
"Appellant should not be ~Uowed to sue the insunm.ce company directly any more 
than a tort victim injured in an automobile adcident should be able to directly sue 
the insurance camer of tHe tortfeasor without havirig first proved a claim against 
the tortfeasor individuall~." (Emphasis add~d.) According to the Hartrnans, the 
emphasized language in~icates that once ttie injUred party has proved a claim 
against the tortfeasor indo idually, the injur~d party cal1 then sue the tortfeasor's 
insurance carrier directly. The Hartmans read that portion of the Downing opinion 
too broadly, and overlook our clarification o:f it in Graham v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance cOr' 13 8 Idaho 611, 67 P.3d:;90 (2003). ; 
In Graham, the plaintiff had Obtaine~ a j~gment for $2,100 against the 
insured in small claims cJurt, and the insurance company appealed, At the trial de 
novo on appeal, the plaintiff obtained al judglnent against the insured for 
$2,602.50. He then filed ~ action against the insuTauce company alleging that by 
appealing the small clairhs judgment, it brJached: ~ drty of good faith and fair 
dealing owing to a judgrrlent creditor of its ihsured, When arguing that we should 
recognize such cause of hction, he relied u~on the same portion of the Downing 
opinion as do the Hartmaps here. We rejecte~ the&gument and explained that the 
plaintiff in Graham was reading too much into; thaf portion of the Downing 
opinion. 
In context, this statement does not establish: Graham's position. The 
controversy in the Dobng case was on~ of a ~'direct action of an employer 
against an insurer, b1a party not a party to the insurance contract," and it' 
did not concern a thir -party with a judgIinent The point on which the court 
dis?ose? ?f the case I as t~e ~act tha~ thelplain#ff h~d attempted to bring an . 
actlOn ' WlthOUt first ertabhShmg entltlerl1ent to:;anydeath benefits under the 
collective bargaining agreement, appeUant"'1:?9 ~*346 is attempting to 
circumvent the requiryment that she esta~lish a iigN under the death benefit 
provision of the collective bargaining ~greemerit.'r Downing was decided 
prior to White v. Uni¥ard [ Mutual l,nsur!mc~,l f2 Idah? 94, 730 P.2~ 1014 
(1986)) and cannot be read to estabhsh the nghtofla thud party to bnng an 
~ction for the breachlof good fait~ and rair d~:aling against the tortfeasor's 
msurance company. In Idaho there IS no such nght.; 
\38 Idaho at 614, 67 p+ at 93 (internal ciJ.tiOOS'Oi,i.ledl 
AJJy rights ag~~fst U oited Heritagb that' $e : Hartrnans may acquire as 
judgment credito:s of :'1,:ane c~ot be gr~ater than t;he rights that Keane would 
herself have agamst ured Rentage. If the HITaDS executed upon Keane's 
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' i;, , 
claims against United Heilitage, they couid ohly o~:ta;ln iwhatever claims she had 
I I, , 
on the day the execution! was levied. I.C, § 11-309. Their status as judgment 
creditors of Keane does riot make them, additionaFinsu.reds under the insurance 
co~tract. E~en if we wer~i to grant th~m the rght t6 fc~k r~covery directly from 
Umted Hentage, rather than by cxecutmgupon wh~~erer clrums Keane may have, 
their right to recover agarst United Heritag~ woul,d[b~, no greater than Keane's 
right to recover. I ~'!: 
I " . 
We have previouSl~ held, "A third ply m~~ L~ directly sue an insurance 
company in an attempt! to obtain the corerag~: ~llegedly due the insurer's 
policyholder." Stonewall$urplus Lines Ins. <1::0_ v.'F¥nlers Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 132 
Idaho 318, 322, 971 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1998). wh'ite tecognizing the no-direct-
action rule, the Hartma~k ask us to hold that the!: in'surance company and its 
insured are prevented fTO~ resolving betwebn th~fu~elves the issue of coverage 
under the policy, at leas,t until the third: party ha~ilitigated its claim against the 
insured. The basis of th~ Ino-direct-action rule is tlja~ t~e person allegedly injured 
by the insured is not a pkty to the insuranc~ contra¢l imd has no rights under it. 
"I~s~ance. policies are a Fatte.r o~ contract betwe~htth~ insurer and the insured." 
Tnnlty l!mversal Ins. C9i v. Kirsll1~g, 139 14ah? 8~,19~, 73 P.3d 102, 105 (20~3). 
We declme to adopt a ru!e preventtng the Pflfhes !;tol that contract from resolvtng 
disputes that may arise bdtween them regarding the;te:rn1s of their contract. 
,j )J':I ! 
Hartman v. United Heritage P~op. & Cas. Co., 141 Id~h at 198-99. If Plaintiffs claim is 
; I' ~! I: I 
, ',' j ~ 
allowed to go forward, she willi be forcing GEICCl to d~f~nd a suit regardless of the possible 
!: I :,1 l ; 
outcomes of any dispute resolution between GElOO and'its !insured. The Supreme Court has 
unequivocally expressed the undeSirability of such Ltion~l Lei rejected the right of a claimant to 
; I . I :! 1 ! . 
interfere in the insurer-insured i~lationship. Plaintiffs Cd~~l~int should therefore be dismissed, 
: I ,I :,.!: , ,I , .. ' , 
'1 " • 
• I CONCLUSiION ;i:; : 
I: I ' ':': ,: ; 
Plaintiffs Complaint n~tablY lacks any id-orrna#oh ~egarding whether or not plaintiff 
ii' I . ; !~' : ' 
, '. .I" , 
claims insured status or has a s4it against Mr. Brooksbj; ?net otherwise fails to assert that any 
caselaw, statute, or contractual!~roVision allows hJ to b~~S Idaho's long-standing rule against 
direct actions by attempting to force a :rulihgl oli !GEICO'S duty to indemnify any 
1 ' 1 I ~" I I 
judgment/settlement which Mr~iBrooksby might uItimatJ~y~ b~ found to owe, absent ~y kind of 
judgment/settlement against ~. Brooksby or eveJ a ,dis~~~e from Mr. Brooksby as to the limits 
I " . 
:1 !:d 1 
ii,' ,;:' 1 
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of his coverage under his GEl!f policy, is Pi~nlY iunmabte under Idaho law. To penmt 
otherwise would allow every cltmnant ill Idallo to file :.dec1aratory actIOns agamst potential 
insurers to merely allow them tJ gauQ:e their iJerllst ~sJJsJing an action against an alleged 'I ~ ! ., ' 
tortfeasor, which would constituib a wholesale ab'an'oL~~iohdahO'S direct action prohibition 
(
'1 h' h Idah sil C hl'; II'd~dd:): . certam y somet mg teo ~reme ourt a~ not en ~!1e :. 
: I j::1 1\; i ! 
Thus, for these reasons and for the reas9ps !tatedpqo~e, defendant GEl CO' s motion to 
, 1 . ( I ~ l , 
dismiss should be granted, and ~()se claims agai~st i b~Plj~t~, as contained in her Complaint, 
'I 1. I f i 
should be dismissed with prejudide and OEICO Jbo~' d bl e ~~arhed its attorney fees and costs. 
II !:. 1 ~. ~ : 
RESPECTFULLY SUB~ITTED this 1~ dayl'Oj~:.1~~' 2011. . 
I I l> I.., ~ : 
: HApL',IF4 . E\y,PBERRECHT & 
, !BLmTO~l P(A. 
l; I.J rl • 
Ii;; II ':<, ' B "i : J'~ , , 
Ke~n l' * I' i, 
B~~ f N' e :- Of the Firm 
AttOp1t(YSO~: .;ef?ndant OEI CO 
. ; . ~~!I : 
, ::.~ 1:,'1 :' 
I I.:: : I 1:;" I : '.. . 
,<CERTIFICATE OF SERViICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY t~at on the l~,j d+ ~(J~Jru~, 2011, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing docu±nent, by the m~thld indidted below, and addressed to each of 
the following: : I '! t :i :. 
: It:, ~, 
Jordan S. Ipsen i ' ~ VS.: I dil, Postage Prepaid 
GORDON LAW FIRM, INC. I :' [] HJid Delivered 
477 Sh S 101 
' 'I [] b I . h' M'1 oup Avenue, teo ~: .! venpg t 31 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 'i Ml feib~pp~ 
Fax: 866/886-3419 ;, [J] Jail sky@brentgordonlaw.com 
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GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-6403 
MINUTE ENTRY ON 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
February 10,2011, at 9:00 A.M., Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. 
Ms. Karen Konvalinka, Court Reporter, and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk, 
were present. 
Mr. Jordan Ipsen appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr. Kevin Scanlan appeared by 
telephone on behalf of the defendant. 
Mr. Scanlan presented argument supporting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Mr. Ipsen presented argument in opposition to Defendant's Motion. 
Mr. Scanlan presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court took the matter under advisement. 
MINUTE ENTRY - 1 37 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Jordan Ipsen 
Kevin Scanlan 
MINUTE ENTRY - 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE. 
CHRISTINA BROOKS BY, 












MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
vs. 
GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY; 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 8, 2017, Craig and Brenda Brooksby and their daughter Cristina were 
traveling from California to Idaho Falls for a wedding. As the Brooksbys were approaching the 
Idaho Falls exit, Mr. Brooksby lost control of the vehicle. The vehicle slid offthe road and 
rolled. The top of the vehicle ripped off and Christina was ejected. Christina was taken to the 
hospital where she was diagnosed with a contusion to the back of her head and three fractured 
vertebrae in the thoracic spine. 
Christina made a claim against her father's insurance policy with GEICO General 
Insurance Company (hereafter "GEl CO") for the damages sustained in the collision. GEICO 
denied the claim based on a "household exclusion" clause in Mr. Brooksby's policy. 
On December 4,2009, Christina filed suit against her father and GEICO in Bonneville 
County Case No. CV -09-7120 (hereafter "suit for damages"). On October 20,2010, Chirstina 
filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of GEICO. Christina, however, does not wish to pursue a 
recovery against her father if there is no coverage for her alleged damages under Mr. Brooksby's 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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insurance policy with GEICO. 1 Thus, on October 20, 2010, Christina filed this action for 
declaratory judgment, asking this Court to determine whether GEICO is required to provide 
coverage for Christina's damages. The Honorable Joel E. Tingey ordered a stay in the 
proceedings of Christina's suit for damages, pending the results of this action. 
On December 15, 2010, GEICO filed a motion to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. On January 31, 2011, Christina filed a brief in 
opposition to GEICO's motion to dismiss. On February 8, 2011, GEICO filed a reply brief. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A court may grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings when there are no material 
issues of fact or law. Davenport v. Burke, 27 Idaho 464, 149 P. 511 (1915). A court may grant a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." 
LR.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
The non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences viewed in his or her favor. Miles 
v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). Yet, the non-moving party's 
case must be anchored in something more than speculation. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal 
Company, 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level." Williams ex ref. Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523 
F.3d 934,938 (9th Cir. 2008) quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570, 127 S. 
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 927 (2007). The allegations must be more "than labels and conclusions, 
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic, 550 
U.S. at 555. 
I Mr. Brooksby's insurance policy containing the "household exclusion" has not been filed. Nor 
have any affidavits been filed by either party in this action. 
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A claim has facial plausibility only when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 
Id. at 556. It asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. 
Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops 
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. at 557. The 
United States Supreme Court explained the analysis a court must take when considering a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings: 
Two working principles underlie [our decision in] Twombly. First, the tenet that a 
court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare 
recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements. 
Second, determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-
specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common 
sense. A court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by identifying 
allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's 
framework, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-
pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. 
Ashcroflv. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1940,173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). 
III. DISCUSSION 
By this action, Christina seeks to establish the insured status of her father and the 
coverage under his insurance policy with GEICO for her claimed damages. Christina argues she 
"has standing to bring this action pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, I.e. § 10-
1201 et seq." Brief in Opposition at 7. 
GEICO believes this action should be dismissed because it constitutes a third-party direct 
action against GEICO. In its briefs, GEICO cites numerous cases which reaffirm Idaho's "direct 
action rule," which holds that an injured party cannot sue a tortfeasor's insurance carrier directly. 
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'''It is well established that absent a contractual or statutory provision authorizing the 
action, an insurance carrier cannot be sued directly and cannot be joined as a party defendant. '" 
Graham v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 611,613,67 P.3d 90,92 (2003) 
(quoting Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 791, 621 P.2d 399, 407 
(1980). See also Hartman v. United Heritage Property and Cas. Co., 141 Idaho 193, 199, 108 
P.3d 340,346 (2005); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho 89, 92, 73 P.3d 102, 105 
(2003); Stonewall Surplus Lines Insurance v. Farmers Insurance, 132 Idaho 318,971 P.2d 1142 
(1998); Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co. a/Idaho, 118 Idaho 373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990); Downing v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 511, 515, 691 P.2d 375, 379 (1984). 
There is no dispute that under Idaho's direct action rule Christina lacks standing to bring 
an action for damages against GEICO because she is not a party to the insurance policy. 
Christina asks this Court to conclude that Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act broadens the scope 
of persons who have standing to sue on an insurance contract. 
Idaho Code Section 10-1202 describes the parties that are authorized to bring an action 
for declaratory judgment: 
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings 
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
In Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rei. Andrus, 127 Idaho 239,245,899 P.2d 
949,955 (1995) (hereafter "SPBA I"), two environmental groups sued the Idaho State Board of 
Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands seeking to challenge a timber sale. 
Trying to assert their standing to maintain the suit, the environmental groups argued that the 
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Declaratory Jedgment Act "somehow broadens the scope of standing." The court responded to 
that argument, stating, 
While the Declaratory Judgment Act may potentially expand the scope of 
remedies available to the environmental groups if they are ultimately successful, it 
does not relieve them of the obligation to demonstrate that they have standing to 
bring the action in the first instance. Therefore, the environmental groups' claim 
that they have standing because a declaratory judgment would resolve the "rights, 
status, and legal relations existing between the parties" is without merit. 
Id (emphasis added). 
In a separate suit regarding a different timber sale, the same environmental groups tried 
to establish standing pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act in order to challenge the 
constitutionality ofIdaho Code §§ 58-405 and 407. The court again reaffirmed the rule that "the 
Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the 
action in the first instance." Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex reI. Batt, 128 Idaho 831, 
919 P.2d 1032 (1996) (hereafter "SPBA II"). The court then recited the rules that govern 
standing in an action to challenge statutory provisions. Because the environmental groups lacked 
"standing to challenge the timber sale in the first instance, it [could] not maintain a claim of 
invalidity under the Declaratory Judgment Act." Id 
Although the subject of this suit is the interpretation of an insurance contract rather than 
the constitutionality of statutory provisions, Christina's position in this litigation and the question 
of her standing is remarkably similar to that of the environmental groups in SPBA I and SPBA 
II. To the extent that Christina could be considered an "interested" person under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, that fact alone would not give Christina standing to bring this action. Christina's 
argument that the "direct action rule" does not apply to declaratory judgment actions is 
essentially the same argument made by the environmental groups in SPBA I and SPBA II-that 
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standing is broader when making a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act than it is 
otherwise. The Idaho Supreme Court has rejected that argument on two occasions. Furthermore, 
Christina has not supported her argument with any authority that is binding upon this Court. 
This Court concludes that Christina cannot maintain this action against GEICIO without 
manifesting a "contractual or statutory provision authorizing the action." See Graham, 138 
Idaho at 613,67 P.3d at 92. Christina has never asserted that a contractual relationship exists 
between her and GEICO. Christina has never asserted that any provision of the contact between 
GEICO and her father gives her authorization to sue GlECO. Christina has not cited any 
statutory provision that gives her authority to sue on the contract between her father and GEICO. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
GEICO's motion to dismiss should be granted. 
DATED this -U- day of March 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 6 day of March 2011, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by 
causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Jordan S. Ipsen 
GORDON LA W FIRM, INC. 
477 Shoup Ave, Suite 101 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Kevin J. Scanlan 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
B~/tfi) 
Deputy <tlerk 
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Case No. CV-10-6403 
JUDGMENT RE: MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
This cause having come before this Court pursuant to GEICO's January 31, 2011 Motion 
to Dismiss, this Court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing; 
NOW, THEREFORE: 
GEICO's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
DATED this ~ day of March 2011. 
~~ DA~H. WATK S,JR. 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this B day of March 2011, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by 
causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Jordan S. Ipsen 
GORDON LAW FIRM, INC. 
477 Shoup Ave, Suite 101 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Kevin 1. Scanlan 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
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RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
Jordan S. Ipsen (ISB #7822) 
GORDON LAW FIRM, INC. 
477 Shoup Ave, Suite 101 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 552-0467 
Facsimile: (866) 886-3419 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
CHRlSTINA BROOKSBY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. CV-I0-6403 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, KEVIN SCANLAN, HALL, FARLEY, 
OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A., 702 WEST IDAHO STREET, SUITE 700, BOISE, 
IDAHO 83701, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Christina Brooksby, appeals against the above named 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment entered in the above 
entitled action on the fourth day of March, 2011, Honorable Judge Dane Watkins 
presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 
II(a)(I), I.A.R. 
3. Appellant intends on appealing the issue of whether the district court erred in ruling that 
Appellant does not have standing to bring an action against Respondent. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. 
a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
b) The appellant requests the reporter's transcript in hard copy. Appellant requests 
a partial transcript consisting of the hearing held on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss held on February 10,2011. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.: 
I) Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 12(b )(6). 
2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
3) Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
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4) Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
5) Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Dismiss. 
6) Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Reconsideration. 
7) Order Re: Motion to Dismiss. 
8) I certify: 
a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom 
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Karen Konvalinka 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED THIS 1Z-day of April, 20111. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
Jordan S. Ipsen 
Gordon Law Firm 
Attorney for the Appellant 
50 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on April ~, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Kevin Scanlan 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho Street, Suite 700 
Boise, ID 83701 
Karen Konvalinka 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Case No. CV-I0-6403 
Docket No. 
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County 
Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, presiding. 
Case number from Court: 
Order or Judgment appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
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